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11 Introduction
Governments are often forced to issue debt in a foreign currency if their funding
needs cannot be met by issuing debt denominated in the domestic currency due
to various constraints. The latter can arise due to underdevelopment of domestic
bond markets and an attempt to avoid crowding out domestic ￿rms from domestic
currency borrowing (Turner, 2002), the "original sin" (Eichengreen et al., 2003), low
monetary credibility (Jeanne, 2005), or an emphasis of the cost perspective in the
cost/risk trade-o⁄(Broner et al, 2007). A suitable tool for managing foreign exchange
(FX) exposures is the use of ￿nancial (currency) derivatives. Although the use of
derivatives among emerging market economies (EMEs) is increasing in recent years,
their still low utilization in debt management stems from laws (rules) restricting
instruments that can be used for debt management, a lack of leading examples, low
sta⁄ capacity, and also a lack of markets for many EMEs currencies (viz. Caballero
and Cowan, 2006; Claessens, 2006; and Bordo and Meissner, 2006).1 As a result
governments can be exposed to FX risk by possibly having currency mismatches
on their balance sheets. The currency mismatches could arise if after matching
the cash ￿ ows from assets2 and liabilities denominated in similar currencies there
still remains an open position in any foreign currency. I thus focus in this paper on
management of the FX risk inherent in an unhedged government debt portfolio3 while
acknowledging the fact that some countries have to borrow in foreign currencies due
to the constraints they face. Hence, I do not attempt to contribute to the literature
on the "original sin" or explain how currency mismatches come about, I take these
circumstances as given.
1The limited use of derivatives also derives from the type and structure of the derivatives.
Although, swapping one hard currency for another is readily available the feasibility of swapping
a foreign hard currency into the domestic currency of a developing country can be limited due to
much larger costs or constrained external convertibility of the domestic currency.
2Usually the most important asset of a government is the present value of its future revenues. As
the revenues are most often denominated in the domestic currency, borrowing in foreign currencies
creates currency mismatches in government￿ s balance sheet. In the case where the revenues are
denominated in foreign currencies, e.g. oil revenues or royalties, borrowing entirely in domestic
currency would also create currency mismatches.
3The latter refers to an open, short position of a sovereign in any foreign currency.
2Based on the review of current approaches to FX risk management of government
debt, provided in Bolder (2005) and Melecky (2007), solutions of typical economic
problems dealing with optimal allocation of foreign currency debt across a spectrum
of available currencies imply that the optimal currency structure of foreign debt is
largely determined by relative magnitudes of variances of exchange rates, with respect
to the considered foreign currencies, and covariances between domestic fundamentals
and the exchange rates. In practice, however, not much guidance can be expected
from the estimated covariances of nominal exchange rates with the domestic primary
balance, see e.g. Bohn (1990a). This is due to, in general, existing inability of
fundamentals to forecast exchange rates, see e.g. Engel and West (2005) and the
high degree of noise incorporated in exchange rates (De Grauwe and Grimaldi, 2005;
and Melecky, 2007) which precludes an analyst from extracting the sought after
information from historical data. Also, the application of ￿xed exchange rate regimes
precludes fair treatment across currencies in the decisions on currency denomination
of foreign debt, and it is not clear why debt managers should rely on the promise of
the central bank to sustain a peg to certain currency, especially in EMEs.
In this paper I propose a macroeconomic approach that one could use as a com-
plement to existing ￿nance (portfolio) approaches (see e.g. Bohn, 1990b; or Giavazzi
and Missale, 2004) when choosing the currency structure of foreign debt. The un-
derlying idea of this paper can be summarized as follows. Consider the bilateral
exchange rate de￿ned as the relative value of two currencies. Unfavorable shocks to
domestic economy will result ceteris paribus in depreciation of the domestic currency
relative to the foreign currency. The same is true for the foreign currency value which
rises with favorable shocks and falls with the unfavorable ones. Consider now three
scenarios. In the ￿rst scenario, if the domestic and foreign economies are converging
in the sense that the shocks hitting both economies are becoming more correlated,
the relative value of the two currencies, the exchange rate, is becoming less volatile.
This is because the value of domestic currency is rising at times when the value of
foreign currency is rising as well. In the second scenario, if however the economies
are not linked at all, shocks either in the domestic or foreign economy will be purely
idiosyncratic and fully re￿ ected in the relative price of the domestic and foreign cur-
3rency, the exchange rate. In the third scenario, if the shocks are in general negatively
correlated, the domestic economy is hit by an unfavorable shock and the domestic
currency value is falling at times when the foreign economy is hit by a favorable shock
such that the foreign currency is increasing in value, and vice versa. The relative
value of the domestic and foreign currency will be signi￿cantly more volatile than in
case (i) or (ii).
Along these lines I suggest to look across a spectrum of foreign currencies avail-
able for foreign debt denomination and pick those for which the domestic shocks and
foreign shocks are positively correlated. Furthermore, it is not only the correlation
of the shocks but their transmission into domestic and foreign fundamentals, that
underlie the domestic and foreign currency values, what matters. I thus propose to
use a measure of synchronization in the movements of relevant domestic and foreign
fundamentals when choosing currency(ies) for denomination of foreign debt. The
proposed approach can be linked to the literature on optimum currency areas (OCA;
e.g. Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1998), the literature on modelling the bilateral ex-
change rate volatility (e.g. Devereux and Lane, 2003) and the literature on currency
preferences (e.g. Kingston and Melecky, 2007). In this paper the interplay between
exchange rate volatility and exchange rate regimes is handled by using the exchange
market pressure index (EMPI) following Eichengreen et al. (1996). Further, I at-
tempt to frame the selection of explanatory variables for exchange rate volatility into
a conventional New Keynesian Policy model that predicts that not only traditional
OCA variables but also those considered by the literature on currency substitution
and complementarity, such as money velocity, should be relevant for explaining ex-
change rate (EMPI) volatility.
The empirical analysis carried out in this paper focuses on middle-income coun-
tries (MICs) for three reasons. First, the high-income countries have usually well-
developed domestic markets or are able to issue debt in their own currencies o⁄shore,
i.e. they do not su⁄er from the "original sin". On the other hand, LICs rely heavily
on o¢ cial assistance from multilateral and bilateral donors that is provided at con-
cessional rates, and thus the choice of currency denomination for their debt is usually
4determined by the supply side.4 Second, the size of shocks varies signi￿cantly for
developed and emerging market economies, see e.g. Caballero and Cowan (2006).
Third, the institutional frameworks of HICs, MICs and LICs can di⁄er considerably
and one may prefer to analyze a more homogenous group of countries that is con-
strained to borrow in foreign currency, and for which the required data are readily
available.
Based on the empirical analysis in this paper, I ￿nd that countries trying to select
a suitable currency for denomination of their sovereign debt can use the measures of
in￿ ation synchronization, money velocity synchronization and interest rate synchro-
nization as indicators, in order to minimize the expected variance of their FX debt
charges due to exchange rate volatility. However, if a country is increasingly using
interest rate di⁄erentials to intervene in the foreign exchange markets the interest
rate synchronization should be viewed as the main indicator when selecting the cur-
rency structure of foreign debt. If, on the other hand, the country is intervening in
foreign exchange markets using its FX reserves to manage an exchange rate(s) the
main indicator to be used is in￿ ation synchronization.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two presents theoret-
ical motivation of the empirical framework used in the paper. Section three describes
the data and estimation methodology. In section four, the empirical analysis is per-
formed using regressions. And, section ￿ve concludes.
2 Theoretical Underpinning
By engaging in FX risk management, a debt manager, on behalf of its government,
aims to minimize the impact of unexpected movements in relevant exchange rates
on the ￿scal budget through debt-service charges. The debt managers thus use their
policy instrument, the currency composition of foreign debt, to minimize the FX risk
4For example, LICs borrowing from the World Bank (IDA) get their funds denominated in SDRs.
And similarly, bilateral donors from e.g. Japan or Germany would lend in Japanese yens or euros,
respectively.
5of the government ￿nancing strategy.5 The benchmark portfolio for foreign currency
debt is then determined by complying with the risk preference of the government.
The debt manager￿ s objective pertaining to FX risk of the public debt portfolio
is speci￿ed in this paper in a way that relates to the tax-smoothing idea. Namely,
the objective funtion focuses on minimizing the ￿ uctuations in government budget
￿nacing requirements to avoid disruptive changes in taxes, unexpected in￿ ation, or
government borrowing under unfavorable circumstances, i.e. at a very high cost.










where ext is a vector of chosen currency exposures, and F FX
t represents the
government ￿nancing requirements subjected to FX risk management. F FX
t is the
di⁄erence between the primary balance, PBt, i.e. the di⁄erence between government
revenues and non-￿nancial expenditure, and debt-service charges exposed to FX risk,
CFX
t :7
Ft = PBt ￿ C
FX
t (2)
Given the de￿nition of CFX
t ; its movements will be determined by 4st the changes
in the exchange rates to which the debt portfolio is exposed, assuming the debt
manager issued a ￿xed-interest bond.8 Using the formula for writing out the variance
of a di⁄erence between two variables9 we can express the objective function for FX
5Although the debt managers￿objective is commonly expressed as minimizing borrowing cost
subject to an acceptable level of risk, I emphasize the risk minimization perspective in the context
of FX risk as its magnitude is potentially much higher than the di⁄erence in the borrowing cost
across major currencies.
6I use here an objective function that focuses on the ￿ ows but the objective for this problem
can be equivalently expressed while focusing on the stocks.
7I thus condition here on the foreign interest rate movements as these constitute a part of interest
rate risk.
8For this to hold at all times the bond has to be perpetual.




[var(PBt) + var(4st) ￿ 2cov(PBt;4st)] (3)
A debt manager￿ s goal is thus to choose a currency for denomination of foreign
debt for which the exchange rate vis-a-vis the domestic currency is relatively stable
and the covariance of the exchange rate and the primary balance is strongly positive,
all subject to cost considerations. In other words, a debt manager cannot in￿ uence
either the variability of primary balance or of the exchange rates but can manage
exposures to those unexpected variations. The debt manager selects the net expo-
sure to a foreign currency by issuing net foreign debt in that particular currency.
The exposure will vary as the domestic economy, including the exchange rate, and
the government balance sheet are hit by various shocks. The covariance terms then
represents the aim of the debt manager to select such a foreign currency for denomi-
nation of FX debt that at times primary balance is worsening the exchange rate with
respect to the selected foreign currency is improving (appreciating).10
It is important for a debt manager to try to understand each term of equation (3)
to e⁄ectively manage the exposure to FX risk. In this paper I will mainly focus on the
second terms of equation (3), var(4st) for the following reason. In practice, it might
be di¢ cult to justify large ￿ uctuations of debt-service charges due to exchange rate
movements by pointing to a larger net primary balance or ￿scal revenues arising at the
same time. Although this is something economically correct the political economy
constraints may be binding in this respect. Especially, public debt managers in
developing countries therefore often choose to initially minimize the variance of the
service charges on their debt portfolio while minimizing the long-term costs of their
borrowing strategies. The volatility of debt-service charges due to excessive exchange
rate risk are then captured by the exchange rate volatility. This paper thus tries to
10Each economy is likely to be in￿ uenced by exchange rate variations to a di⁄erent extent, given
its country-speci￿c pass-through of exchange rates to the overall domestic price level and the degree
of openness of the economy. Moreover, government revenues can be to a di⁄erent degree dependent
on income from tradables as opposed to non-tradables. This implies that the primary balance is
a⁄ected by exchange rate variability to a di⁄erent degree. The latter interdependencies between
the primary balance and exchange rates are captured by the covariance term in equation (3).
7provide some practical guidance in the ￿rst step of understanding the term var(4st)
of equation (3).
Next, I will focus on identi￿cation of possible empirical indicators for selecting
foreign currencies with relatively low volatility of exchange rates with respect to
a domestic currency. I motivate and frame the selection of candidate explanatory
variables for exchange rate volatility using the New Keynesian Policy model ala
Clarida et al. (1999):
yt = ￿yEtyt+1 ￿ ￿R (it ￿ Et￿t+1) + "
IS
t (4)





mt = yt ￿ ￿iit + "
MD
t (6)
it = ￿￿￿t + ￿yyt + "
MP
t (7)
where yt is the output growth, ￿t is in￿ ation, mt is the deviation of real money
balances from their steady state value, and it is the short-term, money market interest
rate. "t￿ s represent structural shocks with attached superscripts identifying their
type. Et stands for model consistent rational expectations conditional on information
available to the agents at time t. The Greek letters with respective subscripts are
coe¢ cients.
Equation (4) is the familiar closed economy IS curve derived from a intertemporal
optimization of consumption, where the current output growth increases in response
to positive expectations about future output growth and a decline in the ex ante real
interest rate.
Equation (5) is the Phillips curve describing the dynamics of in￿ ation in a closed
economy where I have augmented the traditional form of the Phillips curve to embed
the response of in￿ ation to disequilibriums in money (asset) markets along the lines of
the empirically justi￿ed P-star model (see e.g. Hall et al., 1991; Tatom, 1992; Garcia-
Herrero and Vasant, 1998; Tsionas, 2001; or Nachane and Lakshmi, 2002). In￿ ation
is thus assumed to increase if there are high in￿ ation expectations, increasing output
growth, and a positive deviation of money supply from money demand.
Equation (6) describes equilibrium in the money (asset) market where the real
8money demand increases in response to increasing output growth and declining in-
terest rate. "MD
t then represents the deviation of money supply from the existing
demand for money.
Equation (7) is a simple Taylor rule that characterizes the response of the central
bank to in￿ ation and output growth. Namely, the central bank is assumed to increase
its policy instrument, the interest rate, in response to positive in￿ ation and increasing
output growth11 to stabilize the economy. In order to ensure stability the central bank
increases the nominal interest rate more than one-to-one with increasing in￿ ation so
that ￿￿ > 1:
Consider a foreign economy that can be described using an identical model to the
one described by equations (4)-(7) with the foreign counterparts being indicated by
￿: Further, assume that the exchange rate is given by the UIP condition, such that
Et4st+1 = it ￿ i
￿
t (8)
Equation (8) seems to imply that one should look at the synchronization of in-
terest rates only, when assessing the exchange rate volatility. However, note that the
solution for it (and also i￿
t) from the model in (4)-(7) can be expressed as a combina-




t : Therefore, one may want to look
at the pairwise synchronization of corresponding shocks in the domestic and foreign
economy. Equation (8) then implies that the variability of exchange rate is going to
be relatively larger if the shocks of the domestic economy are highly asynchronous
to those of the foreign economy. More precisely, this would be the case when the
element-by-element correlations of the vector of domestic shocks and the vector of
foreign shocks are generally negative. However, if the coe¢ cients attached to the
model variables di⁄er for each country, i.e. ￿y 6= ￿￿
y etc., the transmission of the
shocks would be di⁄erent as well, and one has to take this into account.
It is therefore better to look into how strongly the movements in fundamental
11Although I use short-term output growth in this model instead of the output gap, which is
traditionally included in this type of models, the short-term output growth merely represents a
di⁄erent type of detrending of GDP and should thus be seen as analogous to the traditional output
gap measure.
9variables, i.e. yt;￿t;mt and it, are synchronized across the two countries. Also, the
restrictions of the exchange rate model in (8) would constrain us to focusing on
synchronization of interest rates only, however, one would like to encompass in the
analysis a wider range of exchange rate models such as the relative PPP:
4st = ￿t ￿ ￿
￿
t (9)
or the portfolio model of exchange rates:
4st ￿ (mt ￿ m
￿
t) ￿ (yt ￿ yt) + (it ￿ i
￿
t) (10)
Looking across the examples of plausible exchange rate models provides a good
motivation for including the synchronization measures of the movements in yt;￿t;mt
and it into the exchange rate regression in an unconstrained manner. In the spirit of
current open-economy New Keynesian models with a limited pass-through, see for
instance Monacelli (2005), I add the terms of trade, tt, to the vector of fundamental
determinants of exchange rates.
When trying to understand and model the exchange rate variance one faces the
problem that in practice the exchange rate variance is often to a varying degree
managed for some currencies while for others is not. To overcome this I propose
to consider another variable that could be used as a substitute for var(4st) and
that captures the underlying variance in exchange rates. It is the exchange market
pressure index, EMPIt, which I de￿ne in accord with Eichengreen et al. (1996)12:
EMPIt = ￿4st + ￿4(it ￿ i
￿
t) ￿ ￿ (4rst ￿ 4rs
￿
t) (11)
where (i ￿ i￿)t is the interest rate di⁄erential, rst stands for FX reserves and ￿;￿
and ￿ are weights. The rationale for this index is as follows. If capital in￿ ows reverse,
the government can let the exchange rate depreciate. Alternatively, it can defend
12One can argue that capital controls should be brought into the equation as well to broaden the
set of available tools for exchange rate management to re￿ ect the practice. I leave this for future
research due to low data availability and refer the reader to Edwards and Rigobon (2005) for useful
insights.
10the currency by running down reserves or by increasing interest rates (Sachs et al.,
1996). In addition, the index captures some important links to asset and liability
management (ALM). First, adjustments in the interest rate di⁄erential are expected
to a⁄ect government revenues and thus the primary balance. For instance, an in-
creasing domestic interest rate will result in decreasing in￿ ation and output growth,
and thus government revenues. Similarly, depletion of FX reserves will result in a
lower ability of a government13 to explore natural hedges, or the only hedges which it
has available if constrained from using currency derivatives. When determining the
weights ￿;￿ and ￿, the relative importance of the EMPI￿ s components, I again follow
Eichengreen et al. (1996) and set them so that all components are equally important.
Namely, ￿;￿ and ￿ are given by the inverse of the median standard deviation of each
components across countries. I use the median to avoid the leverage e⁄ect of huge
outliers present in my sample, such as Argentina. Since the willingness of monetary
policy to trade variability in one EMPI component for another most likely varies
according to the circumstances of individual economies, see e.g. Hausmann et al.
(2001)14, I also use an unweighted average of the three components to construct an
alternative measure of EMPI to check how robust the acquired results are to di⁄erent
values of ￿;￿ and ￿. In the unweighted EMPI index ￿;￿ and ￿ are all set to one.
By trying to understand the determinants of the EMPI variance across countries we
try to understand why exposures to certain foreign currencies are relatively less risky
for a given country.
In an attempt to acquire a better understanding of why exposures to certain
13Here the government is de￿ned in a broader sense including also the central bank, a government￿ s
agent with separate objectives but working in coordination with the principal. Therefore, the
broader ALM approach considers a consolidated balance sheet including the central government
and the central bank.
14The authors point out the importance of the relative strength of the credit and balance sheet
channels. While reductions in interest rate can have expansionary e⁄ect through the credit channel,
the depreciation induced by the interest rate reduction can be contractionary through the balance
sheet channel. Therefore, as the importance of foreign exchange debt increases the monetary
authority can choose less exchange rate ￿ exibility.
11currencies could be less risky for a give country, I run the following regression:
stdev(EMPIt)i = stdev(Xt:=X
￿
t )i ￿ + ￿i (12)
where Xt ￿ [yt;￿t;vt;it;tt] and vt is money velocity, i.e. the money demand per
unit of local currency. I use the money velocity instead of money balances themselves
as the former appeared to be useful in identi￿cation of currency complements and
currency substitutes15, see e.g. Kingston and Melecky (2007) or Brittain (1981).
stdev(￿) stands for standard deviation of a variable, ￿ is a vector of estimated
coe¢ cients, ￿i is an error term, and the subscript i denotes cross-section observations.
:= stands for element-by-element division. Next, I will discuss the data employed in
the estimation and the estimation methodology.
3 Data and Estimation Methodology
3.1 Data
As described by equation (12) the dependent variable in my estimations is the stan-
dard deviation of the EMPI index. The standard deviations of EMPIt and Xt:=X￿
t
(the ratios of the domestic and foreign fundamentals) are estimated over the period
1976 ￿ 2006 using annual data to maximize the coverage of countries. This implies
that t = 1:::30. The standard deviations are computed for a sample covering 44
middle-income countries16, where I use as reference currencies the four most traded
currencies, i.e. the U.S. dollar, the euro, the Japanese yen and the British pound.
This implies that I have available 176 observations, such that i = 1:::176.17 In the
15Currency complements are de￿ned as currencies with positively correlated money velocities,
while currency substitutes have negatively correlated money velocities. Hence, in the case of cur-
rency complements the money demand is highly synchronized whereas in the case of currency
substitutes highly asynchronous.
16Table (1) presents the list of countries included in the regression analysis.
17I also worked with a larger sample including high-income, middle-income and low-income coun-
tries (75 countries in total) and the results where quite similar. The reason for this is the fact that
the MICs dominated in this larger sample.
12actual regressions I work with two measures of the EMPI. The ￿rst one, as discussed
above, is constructed by setting ￿;￿ and ￿ to the inverse of the median standard
deviation of the relevant components across countries. The second, alternative mea-
sure is constructed as an unweighted average of the EMPI components outlined in
(11), i.e. when setting ￿ = ￿ = ￿ = 1: I use the two di⁄erent measures of exchange
rate volatility under interventions to ensure that the obtained results are reasonably
robust to a simple change in government preferences regarding the applied tools for
exchange rate management.
The exchange rate series of MICs￿currencies vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar were ob-
tained from the IMF￿ s International Financial Statistic where I used the end-of-period
values. The exchange rates for the EUR, JPY and GBP were calculated using cross-
currency exchange rates where the synthetic USD/EUR exchange rate was taken
from the DataStream. The interest rate series used are the money market interest
rates from the IMF￿ s International Financial Statistic where the pre-1999 data for
the euro area were obtained from the Fagan et al. (2001) dataset. The data series of
countries￿o¢ cial foreign exchange (FX) reserves and narrow money (money) were
obtained from the IMF￿ s International Financial Statistic where the series for the
euro area was taken from the DataStream and the FX reserves series extended from
1997 back to 1976 using growth rates of German FX reserves.
The series of GDP growth rates and in￿ ation were acquired from the GDF &
WDI Central database of the World Bank where GDP growth rates and in￿ ation for
the euro area were taken from the Fagan et al. (2001) dataset and the DataStream,
respectively. The money velocity was constructed as the ratio of nominal GDP and
money obtained from the GDF & WDI Central database of the World Bank where
the euro area equivalents were taken from the Fagan et al. (2001) dataset and the
DataStream, respectively. The terms of trade series were taken from the GDF &
WDI Central database of the World Bank and the terms of trade series for the euro
area was constructed as an average of the euro area 12 countries.18 The measures of
synchronization of movements in yt;￿t;vt;it and tt are based on ratios of the national
18I constructed also an average using the four biggest countries Germany, France, Italy and Spain
but the series was very similar to that for the euro area 12 countries.
13fundamentals with respect to those of the U.S., the euro area, Japan and the UK so
that they correspond to the constructed EMPI vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar, the euro,
the Japanese yen and the British pound.
Given that the vector of explanatory variables contains second moments of the
constructed ratios one can expect that possible collinearities will be subdued. Nev-
ertheless, for the sake of completeness I report the pairwise correlations in matrix












t)i ￿0:213 0:033 1:000
￿(it=i￿
t)i 0:187 0:106 ￿0:087 1:000
￿(tt=t￿
t)i 0:096 0:070 0:033 0:011 1:000
(13)
￿ would indicate signi￿cance at the 5% level
The only sizable correlation appears between the synchronization measure of
output and in￿ ation, however, even this is not signi￿cant at the 5 % level.
3.2 Estimation Methodology19
When estimating equation (12) for the sample of 44 MICs, using 176 observations
with respect to the U.S., the euro area, Japan and the UK, by OLS the regression
residuals indicate presence of major outliers and these are those associated with
Argentina. However, when observations on Argentina are given zero weights in the
regression some other less obvious outliers emerge, e.g. in the case of Brazil. One
19The structure of my data set could allow to use a panel data estimation approach, provided
that one can calculate the within-year variance of the exchange rates (EMPI index) employing e.g.
monthly data, and is happy to use within-year variance which might be seen as a somewhat di⁄erent
concept of the dependent variable. Further, a low synchronization of two economies can manifest
itself immediately or with a short or longer lag, and especially in an environment of managed
exchange rates this manifestation can be delayed substantially, but not avoided as I try to argue.
For this reason I prefer to use cross-country regression rather than panel regression, but I see the
two approaches as complementing each other.
14certainly does not want his regression to be contaminated by the presence of huge
outliers but at the same time would like to retain some rigor in the procedure of
detecting such outliers and giving weights to individual observations in the regression.
For this purpose I employ the robust regression methodology.20
The robust regression falls into a general class of the M-estimators, see e.g.









where the function ￿(￿) determines the contribution of each regression residual ei
to the objective function, e.g. least-squares estimation sets ￿(ei) = e2
i:21 Di⁄erenti-
ating the objective function with respect to b, de￿ning   = ￿0 to be a derivative of ￿,
and setting the partial derivatives to zero, produces a system of estimating equations
for the coe¢ cients of interest, b:
n X
i=1




i = 0: (15)
De￿ne the weight function w(e) =   (e)=e, and let wi = w(ei): Then the esti-
mating equations may be written as
n X
i=1




i = 0: (16)
The weights, however, depend upon the residuals, the residuals upon the es-
timated coe¢ cients, and the estimated coe¢ cients depend upon the weights. An
iterative solution, called iterative reweighted least-squares, is therefore required, see
Fox (2002). In this paper, I use the Huber and Tuckey biweight estimators where
￿rst iterations using the Huber estimator are performed and then followed up by
20There are other robust estimation methods with low breakpoints, such as quantile regressions
or the least-trimmed squares regression, that can be used alternatively.
21A reasonable ￿(￿) should have certain properties, see e.g. Fox (2002).
15Tuckey biweight iterations.22 The weights for the Huber estimator decline when
jej > k, while the weights for the Tuckey biweight estimator decline as soon as e
departs from 0, and are 0 for jej > k: The tuning constant k for the Tuckey biweight
estimator is set in the estimations performed in this paper to k = 4:685￿: I follow
Fox (2002) and estimate ￿ as b ￿ = MAR=0:6745; where MAR is the median absolute
residual from the OLS regression.
4 Estimation Results
4.1 The Main Regression
The estimation of equation (12) using the robust regression method outlined in sec-
tion 3.2 produces the results reported in Table (2) below. The estimations are car-
ried out using both the EMPI ala Eichengreen et al. (1996) and EMPI for which
￿ = ￿ = ￿ = 1. I also include the OLS estimation results for comparison and as an
indication of how well equation (12) ￿ts the data.
When looking at the ￿rst two columns under the Robust Regression heading, the
estimation results suggest that the degree of synchronization23 in output growth is not
signi￿cant in explaining the EMPI￿ s standard deviation. The results thus contradict
the ￿ndings of Devereux and Lane (2003) who ￿nd a signi￿cant positive e⁄ect of
business cycles synchronization on exchange rate variance for industrialized countries
and a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect on exchange rate variance for developing countries.
Also, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998) ￿nd that increasing synchronization of output
growth decreases the variability of EMPI using a sample of industrialized countries.
The two latter studies however do not include a measure of synchronization for
in￿ ation in the vector of explanatory variables which I do. At least in the short run,
a part of the output growth can be in￿ ationary thus inducing possible colinearity
between output growth and in￿ ation that can be re￿ ected in the respective measures
22For the exact functional forms see again Fox (2002).
23Recall at this point that higher synchronization of two economic variables implies lower standard
deviation of the ratio of the two variables.
16of synchronization, see matrix (13) for some support of this explanation. In addition,
the e⁄ect of increasing foreign demand (GDP growth in the US, euro area, Japan
and the UK) can be transmitted into the economies of MICs with a lag so that
the co-movements of business cycles might be better captured with an appropriate
lead/lag structure. However, this investigation is outside the scope of this paper.
Indeed, we ￿nd a signi￿cant e⁄ect of in￿ ation synchronization on EMPI vari-
ability, however, signing of this impact implies that higher in￿ ation synchronization
increases EMPI variability. This result is somewhat puzzling and I will return to
its explanation when estimating regressions for the EMPI components later in the
paper. For now, it is useful to keep in mind that it is not only the variances of
the exchange rate, the interest rate di⁄erential and the FX reserves di⁄erential that
determine the variability of the EMPI. It is also the covariances between the latter
three terms that enter into this determination and which could be quite in￿ uential
in periods of external or ￿nancial turbulence, and crises in particular.
The synchronization of money velocities is emphasized by the literature on cur-
rency preferences as a useful tool for detecting currency substitutes and currency
complements, see e.g. Brittain (1981) or Kingston and Melecky (2007). Since the de-
mand for (the marginal utility of) currency complements is positively correlated one
would expect the exchange rates between currency complements to be less volatile.
In other words, higher money velocity synchronization should result in lower EMPI
volatility. This hypothesis is supported by the estimation results from the regression
of the weighted EMPI at the 10 % signi￿cance level. However, the results from the
regression of the unweighted EMPI turn out to be insigni￿cant with a negative sign,
making the overall interpretation inconclusive.
On the other hand, the impact of interest rate synchronization on EMPI vari-
ability is estimated to be signi￿cantly positive. Higher synchronization in interest
rate movements thus signi￿cantly reduces the variability of EMPI. This result holds
strongly both in the case of the weighted and unweighted EMPIs. Given that I have
used short-term interest rates the interpretation can be possibly extended to cover
synchronization in monetary policy settings. However, one could claim that this re-
sult arises purely due to the presence of the interest rate di⁄erential in EMPI. I have
17therefore run two more regressions using an identical set of explanatory variables
and weighted and unweighted EMPIs excluding the interest rate di⁄erential. The
latter could be interpreted as allowing the monetary authority to intervene in the
foreign exchange markets using only FX reserves. The results are reported in Table
(3) and support the previous ￿nding that the degree of interest rate synchronization
is a good indicator of EMPI volatility. Nevertheless, one can see, in the last two
columns under the OLS heading, that the ￿t of the two regressions dropped from
about 0:95 to about 0:40 as a result of excluding the interest rate di⁄erential from
the EMPIs.
Finally, the e⁄ect of the terms of trade synchronization on the EMPI variability
is estimated to be insigni￿cant with an unintuitive, negative sign. This may support
the hypothesis that the relative e⁄ect of capital ￿ ows and associated fundamentals,
as e.g. interest rates, on exchange rates is more important in the case of MICs than
the e⁄ect of real external shocks such as the terms of trade, which are relatively more
important for LICs.
4.2 Regressions of the EMPI Components
This section is intended to provide a more detailed insight into the results obtained
from the main regression and facilitate better interpretation of the acquired general
results especially that of the signi￿cant negative e⁄ect of the degree of in￿ ation
synchronization on EMPI variability. For this purpose I decompose the variance of
18EMPI as follows24:
var(EMPIt) = var(￿4st + ￿4(it ￿ i
￿
t) ￿ ￿ (4rst ￿ 4rs
￿
t))
= var(￿4st) + var(￿4(it ￿ i
￿










t);￿ (4rst ￿ 4rs
￿
t))
What I am interested in is the impact of the explanatory variables, i.e. the
vector stdev(Xt:=X￿
t )i where Xt ￿ [yt;￿t;vt;it;tt] on the individual components
of the EMPI variance described in equation (17). I have therefore run six more
regressions for the case of the weighted EMPI25 and the results for the variance
terms, i.e. var(￿4st), var(￿4(it ￿ i￿
t)), and var(￿ (4rst ￿ 4rs￿
t)) are reported in
Table (4), whereas the results for the covariance terms. i.e. cov(￿4st;￿4(it ￿ i￿
t)),
cov(￿4st;￿ (4rst ￿ 4rs￿
t)), and cov(￿4(it ￿ i￿
t);￿ (4rst ￿ 4rs￿
t)) are presented
in Table (5).
4.2.1 Exchange Rate Variance
The ￿rst column of Table (4) reports the results of the regression for var(￿4st):
It appears that output synchronization is not signi￿cant in explaining exchange rate
volatility. This somewhat contradicts the results obtained by Devereux and Lane
(2003, Table 4 and 5) who ￿nd that for a broad pool of developing countries increasing
output synchronization signi￿cantly increases exchange rate volatility. Nevertheless,
for other smaller pools of developing countries also Devereux and Lane ￿nd that
output synchronization is rather insigni￿cant in explaining exchange rate variability.
24I use here the formula from statistics for decomposition of the variance of a sum of three random
variables, i.e.:
var(X + Y + Z) = var(X) + var(Y ) + var(Z) + 2cov (X;Y ) + 2cov (X;Z) + 2cov (Y;Z)
25I apply the decomposition to the weighted EMPI and report the estimation results for its
components, but the estimation results for the unweighted EMPI ￿ s components are identical only
the estimated coe¢ cients are scaled accordingly.
19Also, the explanatory power of my regression and theirs appear to be very close and
both rather low with R squared around 0:15.
In￿ ation synchronization, on the other hand, appears to be signi￿cant in explain-
ing exchange rate variance. Namely, increasing in￿ ation synchronization seems to
signi￿cantly decrease exchange rate volatility. This result is consistent with the un-
derlying theory unlike the analogous one obtained from the main regression for the
EMPI.
Similarly, the money velocity synchronization is estimated to signi￿cantly a⁄ect
the exchange rate volatility. The more synchronized are the movements in money
velocities between two currencies the less volatile is their respective exchange rate.
This result supports some implications of the literature on currency substitution
and complementarity (see e.g. Kingston and Melecky, 2007), namely, that the ex-
change rate between currency complements should experience less volatility than the
exchange rate between currency substitutes.
Also interest rate synchronization appears to be signi￿cant in explaining exchange
rate volatility where higher interest rate synchronization for a given two currencies
is predicted to decrease the volatility of their respective exchange rate.
Finally, synchronization of the movements in the terms of trade seems to be
insigni￿cant in explaining exchange rate volatility of MICs currencies with respect
to the four major currencies. This ￿nding again points in the direction of capital
￿ ows being much more in￿ uential than terms of trade changes when it comes to the
determination of exchange rates and external balances of MICs.
I have also run the same regression as the one described in the ￿rst column of
Table (4) with 25 % of the cross-section observations with the lowest exchange rate
volatility eliminated from the sample. The results were very similar to those reported
in Table (4) regarding both the coe¢ cient estimates and the explanatory power of
the regression. Only the e⁄ect of in￿ ation synchronization on exchange rate volatility
increased about ten times.
204.2.2 Variance of Interest Rate Di⁄erentials
When looking at how the underlying regression explains the EMPI component pro-
portional to the volatility of the interest rate di⁄erential I estimate two regressions.
The ￿rst one including the interest rate synchronization to see what could be hap-
pening in the main EMPI regression, and the second one excluding the interest rate
synchronization to see how well the remaining variables explain the variability of
the interest rate di⁄erential and whether their coe¢ cient estimates change, since in
the ￿rst regression the e⁄ect of interest rate synchronization on the volatility of the
interest rate di⁄erential is almost tautological.
As we can see in the second and third columns of Table (4) the estimated e⁄ect
of output synchronization on the interest di⁄erential volatility seems to be negative
and signi￿cant. One can probably explain this e⁄ect through synchronization of the
transmission mechanisms related to the credit channels in the domestic and foreign
economies, i.e. managing output volatility implies higher interest rate volatility.
The e⁄ect of in￿ ation synchronization on the interest di⁄erential volatility appears
to be negative in the regression including interest rate synchronization. This result
supports the overall negative signing of in￿ ation synchronization in the EMPI regres-
sion. However, when the interest rate synchronization is removed from the regression
the coe¢ cient on ￿ (￿t=￿￿
t)i becomes signi￿cantly positive. The money velocity syn-
chronization does not seem to signi￿cantly contribute to variability in interest rate
di⁄erentials. Similarly, the terms of trade appear to be insigni￿cant in explaining
the volatility of interest rate di⁄erentials.
4.2.3 Variance of the Relative Changes in FX Reserves
The estimated results from the regression of the variability in the relative changes in
FX reserves are reported in the last column of Table (4). The output synchroniza-
tion is estimated to have a signi￿cantly negative e⁄ect on variability of the reserves
di⁄erential. On the other hand, in￿ ation synchronization appears to have a signi￿-
cant positive e⁄ect on this dependent variable. The remaining explanatory variables,
i.e. the money velocity synchronization, the interest rate synchronization, and the
21terms of trade synchronization do not seem to be signi￿cant in explaining the vari-
ance of the relative changes in FX reserves. The most important ￿nding here is
that the e⁄ect of in￿ ation synchronization is signi￿cantly positive while interest rate
synchronization is insigni￿cant in the regression.
4.2.4 The Covariance Terms
Table (5) reports the estimation results from regressions of the covariance terms on
the vector of employed explanatory variables. Looking across all three regressions
one can observe that the e⁄ect of output synchronization on the covariance terms is
insigni￿cant in the case of the covariance of exchange rates and interest rate di⁄er-
entials, cov(￿4st;￿4(it ￿ i￿
t)), and the covariance of interest rate di⁄erentials and
relative movements in FX reserves, cov(￿4(it ￿ i￿
t);￿ (4rst ￿ 4rs￿
t)), and signi￿-
cantly negative in the case of the covariance of exchange rates and relative movements
in FX reserves, cov(￿4st;￿ (4rst ￿ 4rs￿
t)).
The impact of in￿ ation synchronization on the covariance terms is signi￿cant
in all three cases, however, signing of these e⁄ects varies. For the covariance of
exchange rates and interest rate di⁄erentials, and the covariance of interest rate
di⁄erentials and relative movements in FX reserves the coe¢ cients on the in￿ ation
synchronization are signi￿cantly negative, where the coe¢ cient corresponding to the
former regression is of substantially higher magnitude than other coe¢ cients on the
in￿ ation synchronization measure in the remaining regressions for the EMPI com-
ponents. On the other hand, in the regression for the covariance of exchange rates
and relative movements in FX reserves the e⁄ect of the in￿ ation synchronization is
signi￿cantly positive.
The measure of money velocity synchronization appears to be consistently in-
signi￿cant in explaining the covariance terms, i.e. the covariance of exchange rates
and interest rate di⁄erentials, the covariance of exchange rates and relative move-
ments in FX reserves, and the covariance of interest rate di⁄erentials and relative
movements in FX reserves.
On the other hand, synchronization of interest rates is found to have a positive
22e⁄ect on all three covariance terms, the covariance of exchange rates and interest
rate di⁄erentials, the covariance of exchange rates and relative movements in FX
reserves, and the covariance of interest rate di⁄erentials and relative movements in
FX reserves. However, only in the case of the ￿rst and third covariance terms the
coe¢ cients turn out to be signi￿cant. The signi￿cant coe¢ cient attached to interest
rate synchronization in the regression for the covariance of exchange rates and interest
rate di⁄erentials is much higher in terms of its magnitude than the coe¢ cients on
interest rate synchronization in the remaining regressions for the EMPI components.
Finally, the e⁄ect of the terms of trade synchronization is estimated to be sig-
ni￿cant only in the case of the covariance of exchange rates and relative movements
in FX reserves. In the latter case, the e⁄ect of the terms of trade synchronization
appears to be positive and signi￿cant at the 10 % level.
4.3 Summary of the Estimation Results
It is useful at this point to summarize the detailed estimation results obtained from
the regressions for the EMPI components and relate those to the estimation results
from the main regression. From the main regression we have inferred that the ef-
fect of interest rate synchronization on EMPI variability is signi￿cantly positive by
regressing EMPIs including and excluding the interest rate di⁄erential. The sig-
ni￿cantly positive e⁄ect of the interest rate synchronization was con￿rmed in the
regressions for the EMPI components. Most importantly, the signi￿cantly positive
e⁄ect of the interest rate synchronization held also in the regression of the exchange
rate volatility on the employed vector of explanatory variables. In addition, an in-
teresting ￿nding is that the interest rate synchronization appears to be insigni￿cant
in all EMPI components regression where the relative movements in FX reserves are
involved.
Further, I ￿nd a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect of the in￿ ation synchronization in the
main regression that was viewed as puzzling. The regressions of the EMPI com-
ponents have been very insightful in explaining this puzzling result from the main
regression. Namely, I have found that the estimated negative coe¢ cient on in￿ ation
23synchronization in the main regression is most likely attributable to the signi￿cant
negative e⁄ect of in￿ ation synchronization on the covariance between the exchange
rates and interest rate di⁄erentials, on the covariance between the interest rate
di⁄erentials and relative movements in FX reserves, and also on the variability of
the interest rate di⁄erential. On the other hand, the e⁄ect of in￿ ation synchroniza-
tion on exchange rate variance itself is signi￿cantly positive and consistent with the
underlying theory.
In addition, I ￿nd the synchronization of money velocities to be highly signi￿cant
in explaining the exchange rate volatility. The increasing money velocity synchro-
nization between two currencies, that identi￿es currency complements, signi￿cantly
decreases the variability of the respective exchange rate.
Based on these results I draw the following preliminary conclusions. Namely, that
countries trying to select a suitable currency for denomination of their sovereign debt
can use the measures of in￿ ation synchronization, money velocity synchronization
and interest rate synchronization as indicators, in order to minimize the expected
variance in their FX debt charges due to exchange rate volatility. However, if a
country is increasingly using interest rate di⁄erentials to intervene in the foreign
exchange markets the interest rate synchronization should be viewed as the main
indicator when selecting the currency denomination of foreign debt. If, on the other
hand, the country is intervening in foreign exchange markets using its FX reserves
to manage an exchange rate(s) the main indicator to be used is the in￿ ation syn-
chronization.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I have made an attempt to propose a macroeconomic framework for
management of foreign currency debt that can be used in conjunction with or as an
alternative to the existing ￿nancial (portfolio) approaches to selecting suitable cur-
rencies for foreign debt denomination. The proposed framework is aimed at selecting
such a currency for denomination of foreign debt that will minimize the variability
of debt charges on foreign exchange debt. For practical purposes the default variable
24that I was trying to explain was the exchange market pressure index. The latter con-
trols for the possibility of exchange rate management using interest rate di⁄erential
and foreign exchange reserves when one tries to model the shadow exchange rate be-
tween a pair of currencies equivalent to free ￿ oating exchange rate. Such controlling
is important since changes in the domestic interest rate a⁄ect domestic output and
in￿ ation and thus government revenues, and because ￿ uctuations in foreign exchange
reserves create uncertainty about available natural hedges for foreign debt. The vec-
tor of explanatory variables used in the empirical regressions was motivated using
a New Keynesian policy model which predicts that not only traditional optimum
currency area variables but also variables considered by the literature on currency
preferences, such as money velocity, should be relevant for explaining exchange rate
(exchange market pressure index) volatility.
I ￿nd that countries trying to select a suitable currency for denomination of their
sovereign debt can use the measures of in￿ ation synchronization, money velocity
synchronization and interest rate synchronization as suitable indicators in order to
minimize the variance in their foreign exchange debt charges due to exchange rate
volatility. However, if a country is increasingly using interest rate di⁄erentials to
intervene in the foreign exchange markets the interest rate synchronization should
be viewed as the main indicator when selecting the currency denomination of foreign
debt. If, on the other hand, the country is intervening in foreign exchange markets
using its FX reserves the main indicator to be used is the in￿ ation synchronization.
The future work on the macroeconomic approach to foreign exchange debt man-
agement should focus on incorporating the role of covariances between the govern-
ment primary balance and exchange rates, from the ￿ ow perspective. Or equivalently,
from the stock perspective, it can focus on incorporating the covariances between the
net exposures in individual currencies and the relevant exchange rates into the present
framework. Further, the set of considered indicators can be broadened to include
other macroeconomic fundamentals, e.g. the term structure of interest rates.
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28Algeria Czech Rep. Jordan Namibia St.Vinc.& Grenad.
Argentina Dominica Latvia Panama Swaziland
Armenia Dominican Rep. Lithuania Paraguay Thailand
Bolivia El Salvador Malaysia Philippines Tunisia
Brazil Estonia Maldives Poland Turkey
Bulgaria Georgia Mauritius Russian Fed. Ukraine
Chile Grenada Mexico Slovak Rep. Uruguay
Colombia Guatemala Moldova South Africa Venezuela, RB
Croatia Indonesia Morocco Sri Lanka
Table 1: Countries Included in the Regression Analysis
29Dependent Variable Robust Regression OLS
stdev(EMPIt)i (weighted) (unweighted) (weighted) (unweighted)
￿(yt=y￿
t)i ￿36:54 156:8 ￿183:0 83:48
(0:35) (0:30) (1:13) (0:14)
￿(￿t=￿￿
t)i ￿11:43 ￿37:22 ￿11:05 ￿23:46
(4:86)￿￿￿ (3:15)￿￿￿ (1:74)￿ (1:22)
￿(vt=v￿
t)i 42:47 ￿34:57 4:44 ￿167:1
(1:68)￿ (0:26) (0:11) (1:10)
￿(it=i￿
t)i 4:37 12:92 4:31 12:82
(174:2)￿￿￿ (71:89)￿￿￿ (12:91)￿￿￿ (6:70)￿￿￿
￿(tt=t￿
t)i ￿21:34 ￿4:17 22:36 120:1
(1:20) (0:05) (0:61) (0:94)
constant ￿940:6 ￿2812: 316:7 ￿5421:
(0:83) (0:49) (0:22) (1:10)
R squared na na 0:9631 0:9350
No. of Obs. 174 174 176 176
Table 2: Estimation Results - EMPI volatility regressions
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t)i ￿0:04 ￿1:13 ￿5:29 ￿232:6
(0:47) (0:61) (1:08) (1:07)
￿(it=i￿





t)i 0:05 1:41 1:97 86:04
(0:84) (1:10) (0:83) (0:82)




R squared na na 0:3984 0:3960
No. of Obs. 173 173 176 176
Table 3: Estimation Results - EMPI (no IRD) volatility regressions
30Dependent Variable Robust Regression
stdev(EMPIt)i components ￿(4st)i ￿(4(it ￿ i￿
t))i ￿(4(it ￿ i￿
t))i ￿(4rst ￿ 4rs￿
t)i
￿(yt=y￿
t)i ￿0:009 ￿152:98 ￿5:913 ￿0:164
(0:09) (0:68) ￿￿ (2:02) ￿￿ (2:31)
￿(￿t=￿￿
t)i 0:002 ￿11:46 0:179 0:005
￿￿￿ (10:06) ￿￿ (2:23) ￿￿￿ (2:67) ￿￿￿ (2:87)
￿(vt=v￿
t)i 0:072 65:59 ￿0:523 ￿0:012
￿￿￿ (2:85) (1:15) (0:70) (0:67)
￿(it=i￿
t)i 0:001 5:05 na 0:001
￿￿￿ (27:3) ￿￿￿ (86:0) na (0:15)
￿(tt=t￿
t)i ￿0:020 ￿16:42 0:084 0:017
(1:13) (0:42) (0:17) (1:38)
constant 1:023 ￿874:19 68:95 1:852
(0:92) (0:35) ￿￿ (2:13) ￿￿ (2:37)
No. of Obs. 176 174 176 173
OLS R squared 0:1422 0:9377 0:6410 0:3939
Table 4: Estimation Results - Break-Down EMPI volatility regressions, part I
Dependent Variable Robust Regression
stdev(EMPIt)i components ￿(st;it ￿ i￿
t)i ￿(st;rst ￿ 4rs￿




t)i 312:2 ￿2:521 106:5
(0:30) ￿￿￿ (3:39) ￿ (1:82)
￿(￿t=￿￿
t)i ￿152:5 0:074 ￿4:787
￿￿￿ (6:43) ￿￿￿ (4:38) ￿￿￿ (3:60)
￿(vt=v￿
t)i 326:2 ￿0:229 6:808
(1:24) (1:22) (0:46)
￿(it=i￿
t)i 57:3 0:001 0:372
￿￿￿ (169:5) (0:72) ￿￿￿ (10:90)
￿(tt=t￿
t)i ￿238:2 0:215 ￿15:17
(1:32) ￿ (1:67) (1:50)
constant ￿16553 16:96 ￿461:3
(1:45) ￿￿ (2:07) (0:72)
No. of Obs. 173 173 173
OLS R squared 0:9217 0:3945 0:3939
Table 5: Estimation Results - Break-Down EMPI volatility regressions, part II
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